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inTroducTion
Does Spinoza allow human teleology or not? This is only one of questionable issues in spinozism to which the experts 
of Spinoza’s philosophy offer different answers. 
Suffice it to quote the statement of E. A. Greetis: 
“I argue, contra Lin, that Spinoza is committed 
to a rejection of teleology, and contra Bennett, 
that Spinoza is consistent in his rejection of 
teleology”1. Why would human teleology be 
unacceptable for Spinoza, and does he really 
rejects it radically or not?
Before I try to give my answers to 
this questions it should be explicated what is 
meant by „human teleology“. Shortly, it’s about 
explanation of human acting insofar as it is 
done for the sake of some future goal.2 Spinoza, 
1 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection of 
Teleology. Revista Conatus – Filosofia de Spinoza, 
v.4, n.8, Dez. 2010, 25.
2 Della Rocca will say: “[...] Such an explanation of an 
action which proceeds in terms of one’s desires or goals 
and beliefs about the future is a teleological explanation 
within psychology”. (DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza’s 
metaphysical psychology. In: GARRETT, Don (ed). The 
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 252). Let’s quote 
three more definitions of teleological explanations: “[...] 
in a teleological explanation the event is usually explained 
by reference not directly to an effect of it but rather to 
an antecedent thought about an effect of it”. (BENNETT, 
Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 217); “[...] in Spinoza 
studies, as also elsewhere, by ‘teleology’ is most often 
meant a certain scheme of explanation in which items 
are explained by citing their (beneficial) future effects”. 
(VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics of Being: 
The Concept of Power and its Role in Spinoza’s 
Metaphysics. Turku: Painosalama Oy, 2007, p. 186); 
explaining that teleological explanations we find in every 
thing as far as it strives to its preservation, S. Nadler stresses 
that such a behavior in human case is particular because 
it implies aware consciousness and so “teleological setup 
of course, doesn’t deny that human imagines 
some future state as un/desirable but states that 
human does something on basis of the present 
pleasure/pain by anticipation of some future 
pleasure/pain, and that final cause is, indeed, 
efficient cause (present pleasure/pain) which 
moves to action. In another words, the present 
event would be, in a teleological explanation, 
explained by a future event but since the present 
event causes the future one, explanation must 
move from the present event, which is cause, to 
the future event, which is effect, not vice-versa. 
Spinoza is quite sparing of concrete examples 
in which we realize that what we are used to 
see as a final cause is actually efficient cause, so 
it pays to quote completely Spinoza’s example 
about it:
What is termed a “final cause” is nothing 
but human appetite insofar as it is 
considered as the starting point or primary 
cause of something. For example, when we 
say that being a place of habitation was the 
final cause of this or that house, we surely 
mean no more then this, that a man, from 
thinking of the advantages of domestic life, 
had an urge to build a house. Therefore, 
the need for a habitation insofar as it is 
considered as a final cause is nothing but 
this particular urge, which is in reality an 
efficient cause, and is considered as the 
prime cause because men are commonly 
ignorant of the causes of their own urges; 
for, as I have repeatedly said, they are 
conscious of their actions and appetites but 
unaware of the causes by which they are 
determined to seek something (E3Praef).
Is it enough to say that all what is needed 
for a man, in order to build a house, is an urge 
becomes something different: intentional behavior that 
involves setting goals for oneself and then striving to 
achieve them”. (NADLER, Steven. Spinoza’s Ethics. An 
Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006, p. 199).
* doctor of philosophy from Croatia. 
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to build it which functions as an efficient cause 
or it was needed something more? By citing 
Spinoza’s explanation of building a house I 
only touched what we are dealing with here. In 
order to be able to see whether his explanation 
is satisfactory or not, we must take look at 
Spinoza’s arguments against human teleology, 
their validity, and the way how to explain 
numerous places in which Spinoza himself 
speaks of man’s end or purpose of his acting. 
Therefore I divided the article in three basic 
parts: 1) arguments against human teleology 
(naturalism, parallelism, causal internalism, 
scientific and enlightenment reasons); 2) implied 
human teleology in spinozism; 3) arguments 
for human teleology. I’ll show that in Spinoza’s 
philosophy there is a room for a human teleology, 
especially in cases which are of great importance 
for man’s success in his preserving in being 
and increasing his power of acting. Namely, 
arguments that Spinoza himself exposes, or 
some other exposes on behalf of Spinoza (causal 
internalism) are not, by themselves, strong 
enough to exclude every possibility of human 
teleological acting. So, let’s start step by step!
1 argumenTS againST human Teleology
As I said before, Spinoza’s works offer 
different reasons against human teleology. 
Basically, by antiteleological arguments it is 
meant to preserve the coherence of spinozism. 
In another words, human acting should be 
explained in terms of the same laws that govern 
behaviors of every other thing, starting from 
God and proceeding to a stone, i.e., man must 
not be “a kingdom within a kingdom”.
a) NaturalisM
Naturalism in spinozism expresses 
Spinoza’s ambition to explain all things, in 
their being and acting, as those that obey the 
same laws. It seems that behind such a strategy 
lies the rationalistic tendency to understand 
and explain, as far as possible, all things. Such 
a tendency is more realized if everything is 
governed by the same laws then in case that some 
segments of reality follow their own laws. That’s 
why the isolation of man and his emotions from 
the rest of Nature is unacceptable for Spinoza. 
Such an isolation used to be accomplished by 
his predecessors who 
appear to go so far as to conceive man in 
Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. 
They believe that he disturbs rather than 
follows Nature’s order, and has absolute 
power over his actions, and is determined 
by no other source than himself (E3Praef).
“Disturbing” the Nature’s order refers 
here precisely to a man as an isolated case or 
exception who allegedly follows his own rules. 
Spinoza’s predecessors didn’t notice that the 
Nature is 
always the same, and its force and power of 
acting is everywhere one and the same; that 
is, the laws and rules of Nature according 
to which all things happen and change 
from one form to another are everywhere 
and always the same (ibid).
The man (and God) is traditionally seen 
as isolated case in comparison to other things, 
but Spinoza’s tries to see a man and his emotions 
in the same way as every other thing:
I shall, then, treat of the nature and 
strength of the emotions, and the mind’s 
power over them, by the same method as I 
have used in treating of God and the mind, 
and I shall consider human actions and 
appetites just as if it were an investigation 
into lines, planes, or bodies. (ibid).
If Spinoza is successful in his intention 
to describe human acts and appetites as those 
that are governed by the same rules by which 
are governed God, lines, planes or (inanimate) 
bodies, it will be no more possible to talk about 
man as “a kingdom within a kingdom”, that is, 
as the one who “disturbs the Nature’s order”. 
Della Rocca therefore rightly concludes: 
Such a unification of explanatory principles 
is the heart of Spinoza’s naturalism about 
psychology: human psychology is governed 
by the same fundamental principles that 
govern rocks and tables and dogs. Thus no 
new principles are needed to explain human 
psychology beyond those principles needed 
to explain the rest of nature anyway.3         
Namely, if a man would be governed by 
the special laws that are not reducible to general 
laws, those special laws would be inexplicable 
because they can’t be deduced from the general 
laws. Because of their being heterogeneous 
3 DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza. Taylor & Francis 
e-Library, 2008, p. 6.
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when compared to the general laws, we couldn’t 
explain the nature of relation of man to the rest 
of Nature. Because of inexplicability of those 
local laws which holds only for man, man’s 
acting and nature would also be inexplicable 
and so we would have “brute facts”.
Let’s sort all things into three groups: 
God, men, infrahuman beings (including 
mathematical entities). Spinoza gives several 
arguments why God can’t act teleologically. First 
of all, Spinoza’s God is not a being endowed 
with personality, reason and free will, and as 
such cannot imagine in advance what kind of 
things (or world) to create in order to be able 
afterwards to choose and to realize one of many 
possibilities. Then, God’s teleological acting is 
incompatible with his perfection; that is, the 
doctrine of God’s teleological acting “negates 
God’s perfection; for if God acts with an end in 
view, he must necessarily be seeking something 
that he lacks” (E1P36App). Men are governed by 
the religious prejudice “for they say that God has 
made everything for man’s sake and has made 
man so that he should worship God” (ibid.). 
That would mean that God “needs” worship of 
human beings. But, if he needs something he is 
not perfect. Teleological doctrine not only ruins 
God’s perfection but it ruins the hierarchy of 
perfection levels in created modes. If we suppose 
that the man is a final purpose of God’s creating 
than it looks the man to be the reasons for existing 
of prior ontological entities (infinite modes) 
and in that sense to be more perfect than they. 
However, Spinoza claims that the thing produced 
more directly from God is also more perfect (cf. 
ibid). Finally, the divine intellect doesn’t make 
part of Natura naturans but of Natura naturata 
(cf. E1P31). It means that it is a God’s product 
and not some kind of a primordial divine ability 
necessary for “choice” among different worlds 
before creating one of them. 
As for infrahuman beings which make 
up the majority in Nature, Spinoza doesn’t even 
try to prove that they don’t act teleologically, 
and this is understandable: the beings that 
have no reason cannot, by definition, imagine 
future states of which they are aware and then 
opt for one of them. Besides, in the center of 
Spinoza’s interest was the man and not biology 
or physics.
So, there remained only human for 
which we could possibly claim to act in view 
of an end. However, if it is clear that all other 
things don’t act for the purpose then we 
should accept the fact that neither a man is 
an exception. He is not “a kingdom within a 
kingdom”. Antiteleological naturalism is deeply 
rooted in Spinoza’s substance monism, from 
which it follows that God is the only existing 
and acting substance. If it is shown that God 
doesn’t act teleologically, then it must also hold 
for all other beings, including men.
b) ParalelisM
Spinoza, in his philosophy which is 
primarily directed towards ethical issues and 
achieving blessedness, had to face difficult 
problem of mind-body relationship. As an 
important starting point of his own thinking 
on this issue, Spinoza had previous solutions 
offered by stoics and Descartes. The problem 
consisted in showing how human mind can 
affect emotions and moderate them. Both the 
stoics and Descartes offer solution unacceptable 
for Spinoza:
Stoics thought that the emotions depend 
absolutely on our will, and that we can 
absolute command over them. However, 
with experience crying out against them 
they were obliged against their principles 
to admit that no little practice and zeal 
are required in order to check and control 
emotions. (E5Praef).
Descartes basically represents the same 
position: a man, by his will, can affect the 
movements of his body: 
He maintained that the soul or mind is 
united in a special way with a certain 
part of the brain called the pineal gland, 
by means of which the mind senses all 
movements that occur in the body, as well 
as external objects, and by the mere act of 
willing it can move the gland in various 
way. (ibid.).
This pineal gland is placed in the middle of 
the brain and is moved by the animal spirits. 
Interaction between mind and body takes 
place, according to Descartes, through above 
mentioned gland.
Spinoza thinks that Descartes didn’t 
explain this interaction in a satisfactory way: 
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But he had conceived mind as so distinct 
from body that he could assign no one 
cause either of this union or of mind itself, 
and found it necessary to have recourse 
to the cause of the entire universe, that is, 
God. (ibid).
Spinoza ironically criticizes Descartes for this 
offered solution and expresses his wonder how 
such a distinct philosopher could give “a theory 
more occult than any occult quality” (ibid.). 
But, what is solution that Spinoza offers?
Instead of Descartes’ interactionism 
Spinoza offers parallelism. He moves, in this 
doctrine, from a deeper ontological fact that 
“thinking substance and extended substance are 
one and the same substance, comprehended now 
under this attribute, now under that” (E2P7S) 
and that every attribute is conceived by itself 
(cf. E1P10). Then he concludes that “a mode of 
Extension and the idea of that mode are one and 
the same thing, expressed in two ways” (E2P7S); 
that is, there is unity and identity of mind and 
body (cf. E2P13S). If there is identity of mind and 
body, in what consists parallelism between them? 
The short answer is: in their being conceived and 
causation. It’s about the fact that we approach 
something under this or that attribute (under 
which it is only conceivable) and not that it is 
dual in itself. Namely, the divine substance acts 
in way that it simultaneously produces a series of 
modes in every attribute (cf. Ep. 32). In another 
words, we can see the God’s power as the power 
of thinking and as the power of acting, that is, 
“whatever follows formally from the infinite nature 
of God, all this follows from the idea of God as an 
object of thought in God according to the same 
order and connection” (E2P7C). Or, thought and 
extension are different attributes which, as such, 
have nothing in common (cf. E1P2). Things that 
have nothing in common cannot causally act one 
on another (cf. E1P3). Every attribute is conceived 
by itself (cf. E1P10) and mode by the attribute to 
which it belongs (cf. E2P6).
After learning from Descartes that trying 
to explain the interaction mind-body leads to 
great difficulties, Spinoza proposes conceptual 
and causal isolation between modes that belong 
to one or another attribute:
as long as things are considered as modes 
of thought, we must explicate the order of 
the whole of Nature, or the connection of 
causes, through the attribute of Thought 
alone; and insofar as things are considered 
as modes of Extension, again the order of 
the whole of Nature must be explicated 
through the attribute of Extension only. 
(E2P7S).
Spinoza tells us that every concretization 
of a mode under attribute of thought we must 
conceive in its placement within causal-efficient 
series that exists within that attribute. The same 
applies to the attribute of extension. It follows 
that between mind and body can’t exist causal 
interaction: “The body cannot determine the 
mind to think, nor can the mind determine the 
body to motion or rest” (E3P2). Therefore, what 
to an uneducated man seems to be the result 
of mind’s affecting the body to move in this or 
that way or to be at rest is actually manifestation 
of from eternity predetermined and parallel 
causal series of ideas one after another and 
series of body’s determinations: “The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things” (E2P7). If a man is, 
indeed, one entity which expresses the unique 
substance, then his every action or passion must 
be conceived in terms of parallel manifestation 
of his mind and body. Because of underlying 
mind-body identity, among the states of mind 
and body there must exist strict correlation, but 
not interaction. However, why would parallelism 
be incompatible with human teleology?
Obviously, the biggest problem for 
Spinoza is that teleology would imply interaction 
(or would lead to it) between mind and body 
in a way that mind, through its will, moves the 
body to a specific action. Spinoza doesn’t allow 
such a interaction but the question remains: 
how to explain parallel behavior of mind and 
body which, it seems, follow different laws? 
As for mind itself, its particularity would be 
intentionality which cannot be ascribed to body 
as such. Spinoza describes body (after E2P13), 
in its acting, using pure categories of inertia 
taken from mechanical physics. Therefore the 
problem is: how to explain human acts which 
manifest obvious accordance between mind 
and body taking in account the fact that there 
is not, between them, causal and conceptual 
interaction and the fact that they follow, as 
it seems, different laws: intentionality and 
inertia?
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Spinoza, when resolving this problem, 
fulfils some kind of leveling of mind and body 
by means of which he tries to diminish or 
neutralize the qualitative difference in their 
acting. In another words, he tries to “pull down” 
the acting of mind to inertial acting and he tries 
to “elevate” the acting of body to a higher degree 
which would be closer to that one proper to 
mind’s acting. In that sense, speaking of mind, 
it is significant what he says: “I acknowledge 
no difference between human appetite and 
desire. For whether or not a man is conscious of 
his appetite, the appetite remains one and the 
same” (E2AD1E). He understands, by “desire”, 
“any of man’s endeavors, urges, appetites, and 
volitions” (ibid.), but we must recall that he 
defined “desire” earlier as “appetite accompanied 
by the consciousness thereof” (E3P9S).
Actually, Spinoza was comfortable with 
erasing the boundary between appetite and 
desire because he could, that way, realize his 
naturalistic conception (everything is ruled 
by the same laws) in easier way. In that way, 
the qualitative difference between human 
conscious and intentional acting and “acting” of 
an inanimate being (although even in a stone 
there is some idea, whatever it means) would 
be reduced. In other words, Spinoza would be 
comfortable with explaining all things starting 
only from their appetite. All things have 
appetite, but only conscious beings have desire. 
Afore-mentioned “leveling”, when speaking 
of body’s acting, Spinoza fulfils by convincing us 
that we actually don’t know what is the body, by 
itself, capable of, that is, without being guided 
and directed by mind: 
nobody as yet has determined the limits of 
the body’s capabilities: that is, nobody as 
yet has learned from experience what the 
body can and cannot do, without being 
determined by mind, solely from the laws 
of its nature insofar as it is considered as 
corporeal. For nobody as yet knows the 
structure of the body so accurately as to 
explain all its functions, not to mention 
that in the animal world we find much that 
far surpasses human sagacity, and that 
sleepwalkers do many things in their sleep 
that they would not dare when awake – 
clear evidence that the body, solely from the 
laws of it own nature, can do many things 
at which its mind is amazed. (E3P2S).
Having shown that human mind doesn’t 
act moved by final cause but the appetite 
and that body, in its acting, has unimagined 
capabilities, Spinoza believed that he answered 
in satisfactory way the question of how 
any human act can be explained separately 
explaining acting of mind and that of body. 
Although we are accustomed to conceive mind 
as superior to body and as the one that takes 
initiative and leads body according to some 
end, Spinoza tried to show that there is not so 
big qualitative difference between mind and 
body as we are used to think. In another words, 
“there is no more any superiority of soul over 
body, than of the attribute of Thought over that 
of Extension”.4   
c) causal iNterNalisM
Whether speaking of human teleology in 
spinozism is justified or not depends largely on 
whether outside things or future events – which 
we are used to conceive as ends – can in some 
way affect the human present behavior, or such a 
behavior should be conceived mechanically; that 
is, starting exclusively from man’s appetite that 
acts as efficient cause. Spinoza is not completely 
clear about this, and that fact opens possibility 
of various interpretations. Shortly, insisting on 
causal internalism of human ideas that move to 
actions basically makes it impossible to justify 
speech about human teleology because in that 
case the things from outside or future desirable 
states have far less importance (if at all) and 
role in human behavior. We can mention two 
basic variants of causal internalism: 1) based 
on parallelism (Bennett); and 2) based on the 
interpretation of comparata (Greetis).
Bennett, starting from parallelism, 
developed, in Spinoza’s behalf, an argument 
against human teleology.5 This argument 
starts from the statement that causal power 
of ideas relies exclusively on their intrinsic 
properties because the causal power of bodies 
relies exclusively on their intrinsic properties 
too. From “physical digression” after E2P13 it 
follows that “physical events are to be explained 
purely in terms of the shapes, sizes, positions, 
4 DELEUZE, Gilles. Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza. New York: Zone Books, 1990, p. 109.
5 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 219-
225.
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velocities etc. of particles of matter”6, which are 
intrinsic properties that are causally responsible 
for behavior of bodies. Causal properties on a 
level of human mind, parallel to these intrinsic 
properties of body, wouldn’t depend on 
representational properties of ideas, that is, on 
what they represent.7 Their causal properties 
would depend on intrinsic properties that 
move to action although it is not clear what is 
exactly meant, in spinozism, by those intrinsic 
properties.8   
The mind’s ideas have their intrinsic and 
extrinsic properties but these extrinsic properties 
can hardly be mapped on intrinsic properties of 
body without ruining parallelism mind-body9. 
This parallelism is obeyed when we conceive 
intrinsic properties of mind as parallel to the 
intrinsic properties of body, and this intrinsicity 
would be of crucial importance for human acting 
regardless of whether we interpret it from the 
point of view of mind or body:
my thought about possibly obtaining x is 
explained by my desire, my intrinsic state, 
because the representational features of 
thoughts are supervenient on their intrinsic 
features. The basic story is always intrinsic, 
not representational; so a derivative place 
is given to every thought about a possible 
outcome, including the thought ‘It would 
be good to obtain x’. Thus, desires explain 
value judgements on outcomes, and are 
not explained by them10.
After this Bennett’s remark, even more 
important and complex appears the question 
6 BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 219.
7 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit, p. 220.
8 M. Lin tries to shed some light on this problem by 
adducing Dretske’s example: the meaning of the words of a 
libretto is irrelevant for shattering a wine glass. In this case, 
representative property would be the word with its meaning 
(content) but for shattering the wine glass relevant would be 
the power and frequency of voice. The meaning or content 
are extrinsic properties while the power and frequency are 
intrinsic properties (cf. LIN, Martin. Teleology and Human 
Action in Spinoza. In: The Philosophical Review, 
115:3, p. 317-354). H. Allison explains the difference 
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in a sense that the 
former we have in case we conceive a thing in its essential 
properties and the later we have when a thing is conceived 
in its interaction with other things (cf. ALLISON, Henry. 
Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction, New York: 
Vail-Ballou Press, 1987, p. 133). 
9 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 220.
10 BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 224.
can the things from outside (including future 
un/pleasant states) have causal influence on 
a man, or – speaking of human mind – causal 
power of ideas depends only on their intrinsic 
properties?
E. A. Greetis promotes causal internalism too, 
but he starts from non-teleological understanding 
of interaction that happens between man and 
external things. Namely, man, like every other 
thing, cannot avoid interaction with other things. 
In this interaction, there can be competition 
but also synergy of his power with powers of 
the other things. The more a man is under the 
influence of these external things the more he 
is subject to passions and the more depends 
on those things. His acts cannot be explained 
solely by his nature (because they don’t follow 
from it alone) but by natures of other things 
too. Spinoza defines the passion by words:
The essence of a passive emotion cannot be 
explicated through our own essence alone 
[…]]; that is […], the power of a passive 
emotion cannot be defined by the power 
whereby we endeavor to persist in our own 
being, but […] must necessarily be defined 
by the power of an external cause compared 
[comparata] with our own power. (E4P5Dm).
There is a question: whether, and in 
which sense, the power of some external cause 
affects our power when this one is compared 
with it? In another words, does external power 
affect our power in a sense of increasing or 
decreasing it; of specifying it; or only in a 
sense of its defining? Two principle answers 
are possible: one is close to teleological, the 
other is close to mechanical interpretation. 
Greetis promotes the later one,11 and in his 
argumentation confronts Lin’s arguments and 
conclusion.12 Let’s see first what Lin has to say 
about this issue.
Lin develops his argumentation as a 
response to Bennett’s conclusion that motivational 
or causal power of ideas would depend solely on 
intrinsic properties while the representational 
properties would be irrelevant because they are 
extrinsic:
no matter how extrinsic representational 
properties are the causal powers of ideas 
11 Cf. GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s 
Rejection…, op. cit., pp. 29-32.
12 Cf. LIN, Martin. Teleology and…, op. cit., pp. 337-350.
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can still, on Spinoza’s account, depend 
upon them”.13
That can be best seen in cases of passive 
emotions or passions. If the future events, that 
we conceive as ends and which are something 
external to man, can cooperate in causing an idea 
that leads to behavior, then not only the door is 
open to the teleology but Spinoza is, according 
to Lin, committed to teleological explanations 
of human behaviors.14 Lin finds a fundament 
for his argumentation in above cited Spinoza’s 
explanation what would be the essence of a 
passion and how we can and must explain it. He 
translates the controversial word comparata as 
“paired” and not as “compared”.15 He stresses 
in that way the role of external things which 
essentially co-cause human passion because such 
a passion arose through synergy of own power 
and the power of external things. Relying on 
some other Spinoza’s statements on this issue 
(e.g. E3P56 and Dm), Lin concludes:
there are as many kinds of passive affects as 
there are kinds of external objects by which 
we are affected: affects are individuated by 
their external causes.16
Greetis conceive human interaction with 
external things completely different, which is 
clearly evident from his insisting on different 
translation of “comparata”:
As we saw in his translation of E4P5Dem, 
Lin translates comparata as “paired”. Using 
this translation, he determines that causal 
powers of a passion derive from both the 
person’s nature and an external object’s 
nature, i.e., the power of a passion is our 
power paired with an external object’s 
power. Lin’s translation is adequate, 
however, “comparata” is most commonly 
translated as “compared”. Translating 
“comparata” as “compared” seems to 
change the meaning of the passage – form 
Lin’s interpretation – to the following: the 
power of a passion is our power compared 
with an external object’s power, in other 
words, a passion is defined as the person’s 
essence, or power, as it is affected by or in 
relation to an external object.17 
13 LIN, Martin. Teleology and…, op. cit., p. 337.
14 Cf. LIN, Martin. Teleology and…, op. cit., p. 338.
15 LIN, Martin. Teleology and…, op. cit., p. 338.
16 LIN, Martin. Teleology and…, op. cit., p. 338.
17 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection…, 
op. cit., p. 29.
His strategy basically consists in 
showing that we must, when explaining 
human behavior, take into account conatus 
perseverandi which is, as basic strive for self-
preservation, crucial for human acting,18 
i.e., appetite which is that strive when refers 
to mind and body and which “is therefore 
nothing else but man’s essence, from the 
nature of which there necessarily follow those 
things that tend to his preservation, and which 
man is thus determined to perform” (E3P9S). 
Desire, which is that appetite with awareness 
thereof, pleasure and pain, that are passions 
through which man passes in greater or lesser 
perfection (cf. E3P11S), are, indeed, three 
basic passions, but they are nevertheless 
something derived from conatus perseverandi 
which is alone, properly speaking, basic.19 If 
the conatus perseverandi is basic in re, then it 
is also basic when we describe passions. Such 
considerations make Greetis to conclude:
A passion is not – as Lin argues – something 
separate from the nature of a person, which 
receives its causal powers from the nature 
of both an external object and the person. 
Desire is a person’s essence and therefore 
cannot gain some of its causal powers from 
– or have its causal powers paired with – an 
external object’s powers: a thing’s causal 
power simply is its desire or essence.20
Greetis nevertheless allows that external 
things have some role in determining the 
passions. He relies on Spinoza’s statement 
that all desires are based on the three basic 
(desire, pleasure, pain) and that each of them 
“appear under various names according to their 
various contexts and extrinsic characteristics” 
(E3DA48E). Greetis’ considerations about 
passions prevent the speech about human 
teleology because external things and future 
events have no causal influence on individuating 
the passions. In that way, he steps on Bennett’s 
side and concludes:
passions do not have wide causal powers – 
Bennett is correct in thinking that Spinoza 
18 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection…, 
op. cit., p. 30.
19 Cf. GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s 
Rejection…, op. cit., p. 30.
20 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection…, 
op. cit., p. 30.
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rejects all teleological explanations because 
causal powers rely on intrinsic properties, 
i.e., causal powers are a thing’s essence.21
d) scieNtiFic aNd eNlighteNMeNt reasoNs
Spinoza lived and worked in a time when 
scientific revolution flourished. One of the basic 
features of that revolution was insistence on 
explaining the thing’s behavior by use of efficient 
causes according to inertia model borrowed 
from mechanical physics. Things are to be 
explained starting from the present towards the 
future. In such a context, efficient causes are 
suitable because they “push” from the present 
while final causes would “pull” the acting from 
the future.22 In another words, teleology “turns 
Nature completely upside down, for it regards 
as an effect that which is in fact a cause, and 
vice versa” (E1App).
Very important role, in the scientific 
revolution, had mathematics too. Through its 
evidence and coherence, it was paradigmatic 
for other sciences, including philosophy. It 
achieved such success and status because it is 
not concerned “with ends but only with the 
essences and properties of figures” and has, as 
such, “revealed to men a different standard of 
truth” (ibid.). Spinoza invites us to get know, as 
much as possible, the essences of things for we 
shall, that way, understand better which effects 
follow from those essences. Strictly speaking, 
all the things, with their acting, follow from 
divine essence in a strict and determined way:
from God’s supreme power or infinite nature 
an infinity of things in infinite ways – that 
is, everything – has necessarily flowed or is 
always following from that same necessity, 
just as from the nature of a triangle it follows 
from eternity that its three angles are equal 
to two right angles. (E1P17S).
If philosophy wants to follow scientific 
trends and to respect standards posed by 
physics and mathematics, it must not use the 
explanatory scheme which is not adopted by 
physics and mathematics. In another words, 
it must not explain human behavior by final 
causes because a man would be, in that case, “a 
kingdom within a kingdom”.
21 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection…, op. 
cit., p. 31.
22 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 216.
Spinoza, as enlightener, fought against 
human prejudices, false fears and hopes. He 
mentions, as the basic prejudice from which 
arises every other, the one concerning teleology:
Now all the prejudices which I intend to 
mention here turn on this one point, the 
widespread belief among men that all things 
in Nature are like themselves in acting with 
an end in view. Indeed, they hold it as certain 
that God himself directs everything to a 
fixed end; for they say that God has made 
everything for man’s sake and has made man 
so that he should worship God. (E1App).
After men having convinced themselves that 
anthropomorphous God had created everything 
for man’s sake so that he should worship him, only 
one step was necessary to get close to conviction, 
or prejudice, about good and evil, merit and sin. 
If we add religious belief in immortality of soul 
and common belief in human freedom, prejudice 
arises about heaven and hell as the basic things 
which should be sought or avoided. In that way, 
man permanently lives in fear and hope regarding 
his future state. In such a condition, he is guided 
by imagination and not by true knowledge (by 
which he would know that there is not neither 
heaven nor hell) with consequence that he 
becomes easy pray of theologians who proclaimed 
themselves as the sole experts and interpreters 
of holy scriptures. In another words, they gave 
themselves a status that could easily turn to even 
more noble status: they are mediators of the 
eternal salvation. Uneducated mass, frightened by 
the greatest possible punishment, easily became 
pray of manipulation by the same those mediators 
of salvation who very often fulfilled their role 
not guided by honest motivations. In that sense, 
mathematics stepped forward as a true “savior”, 
for it doesn’t care about ends but only about 
essences and properties of mathematical entities. 
It showed another standard of truth and gave an 
example to men so that they don’t conceive the 
thing teleologically but look for true essences of 
things and effects that follow from those essences. 
2 implied Teleology?
After all these reasons against human 
teleology, it seems confusing, at least, the fact 
that Spinoza in many places still uses the words 
“aim”, “end”, “purpose”, “goal”. I’ll quote just 
some of those places.
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a) iN ePisteMology
Spinoza opens his Treatise on the Emendation 
of the Intellect with consideration whether a 
true good exists which we should strive for, 
or which will enable us to enjoy the greatest 
happiness. Realizing that apparent goods that 
the mass strives for (wealth, honour, sensual 
pleasure) are not the true goods, Spinoza 
makes conclusion: “But love towards a thing 
eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy 
alone, unmixed with any sadness” (TIE, § 10). 
Spinoza invites us to fulfill our true nature and 
to achieve the knowledge of our unity with the 
whole Nature and to help the others to achieve 
the same goal. That is the end he strives for (cf. 
TIE, § 13-14). 
In achieving that goal, man should first 
improve his intellect, which means “emending 
the intellect and rendering it apt for the 
understanding of things in a manner appropriate 
to the achievement of our purpose” (TIE, § 18). 
Spinoza also talks about means necessary for 
achieving that purpose (cf. TIE § 25). Insofar 
as the knowledge consists in getting know the 
particular essences, such knowledge should 
be the end of man’s efforts (cf. TIE, §§ 26-29). 
Spinoza surmises the aim in epistemology at 
the end of his Treatise:
Our aim, then, is to have clear and distinct 
ideas, that is, such as originate from pure 
mind and not from fortuitous motions of 
the body. Next, so that all ideas may be 
subsumed under one, we shall endeavor 
to connect and arrange them in such a 
manner that our mind, as far as possible, 
may reproduce in thought the reality of 
Nature, both as to the whole and as to its 
parts. As to the first point, our ultimate 
aim, as we have already said, requires 
that a thing be conceived either through 
its essence alone or through its proximate 
cause. (TIE §§ 91-92).
We should also recall that Spinoza puts 
the third kind of knowledge as epistemological 
end. Achieving such a knowledge not only 
enables man to conceive better the reality but 
it is necessary condition for human happiness, 
“for blessedness is nothing other than that 
self-contentment that arises from the intuitive 
knowledge of God” (E4App4).
b) iN ethics
Purposefulness of action in ethics can be 
seen through Spinoza’s arranging his principal 
work: it proceeds from ontological premises 
and after, by geometrical order, shows what are 
man and his affects; how he is enslaved through 
them; how he can set him free from them and 
achieve the blessedness. The power of reason 
and freedom can be seen as culmination of his 
philosophical thinking and, in this sense, as 
an aim he was tending to. Ethical perfection, 
through adequate knowledge, enable men to 
achieve higher level of activity/freedom.
Whether Spinoza puts some goal in 
ethics we can realize by putting some rhetoric 
questions: was Spinoza indifferent to whether 
a man will live enslaved by his passions or will 
develop active affects under the guidance of 
reason? Or, speaking of “true” goods unlike the 
“apparent” goods, does he simply and neutrally 
describes what would their difference consist 
of or perhaps promotes true goods and not 
apparent ones? It seems that he, by promoting 
specific ends that men should achieve, not only 
promotes human teleology but he himself acts 
teleologically. 
What does Spinoza say about freedom? 
It consists in acting from own nature. Such 
acting is, in truth, determined but is free insofar 
as the result of that acting doesn’t depend on 
external things but arises from own nature 
and is explicable (in greater part, at least) by 
it. Invitation to free action, or putting such a 
freedom as aim, is even more justified and 
reasonable insofar as man is necessarily subject 
to influence of external things he should set 
him free of. The more a man is free the more 
powerful he is and achieves the higher level 
of true happiness. The whole structure of 
Spinoza’s principal work shows the clear ethical 
end that should be achieved: increasing, by 
gaining adequate knowledge, own freedom and 
realizing proper blessedness.
c) iN Politics
Human beings, as citizens, live in 
organized society, and purpose of a civil order 
“is nothing other than peace and security of life” 
(TP V, §2). Through the history of humanity, 
there were different model of government, but 
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Spinoza puts, as ideal and paradigmatic form 
of political set-up, democracy because in it the 
equality and activity are assured to a greatest 
number of men:     
I think I have thus demonstrated quite 
clearly the basis of the democratic state, 
which I have elected to discuss before all 
others because it seemed the most natural 
form of state, approaching most closely 
to that freedom which nature grants to 
every man. For in democratic state nobody 
transfers his natural right to another so 
completely that thereafter he is not to be 
consulted; he transfers it to the majority of 
the entire community of which he is part. In 
this way all men remain equal, as they were 
before in a state of nature. (TTP 16, p. 531).
The citizens, in democracy, have right to 
elect and to be elected as those who implement 
political power. In such a way, they find 
themselves in better position than in monarchy 
or aristocracy, where they are not even 
consulted about state’s policy and in which they 
have no possibility participate in political power 
actively. Democracy is, in that sense, the goal 
the society should aim at. 
Having seen Spinoza’s arguments 
against human teleology, but also some places 
where he invites people to act purposefully, we 
should see what is the real power of arguments 
against human teleology and whether there is, 
anyway, some room – in spinozism – for human 
teleology.
3 argumenTS for human Teleology
In this section, I will first look back at 
argumentative power of antiteleological reasons 
and I will thereafter adduce some arguments 
why Spinoza, after all, allows (and requires!) 
human teleology. 
a) Problem of naturalism
We have seen that human teleology 
doesn’t fit within naturalistic conception, but we 
should ask how much naturalism is successful 
project within spinozism anyway, regardless of 
how much Spinoza insists that the man must 
not be “a kingdom within a kingdom”. Don’t 
we have here too ambitious strategy with weak 
point not only in human teleology but in some 
other places too? For example, what about an 
important aspect of human acting in sense that 
man endeavors to increase his power of action? 
Namely, Spinoza not only makes statement that 
man tends to increase his power of action but he 
invites him to do that. Suffice it to compare the 
fourth and fifth part of Ethics to realize that it 
was Spinoza’s intention. For, when Spinoza puts 
and defines human freedom as a superior form 
of human existing and acting in comparison to 
enslavement, he simultaneously invites man to 
increase his freedom and power of action. Every 
Spinoza’s statement about what is really useful 
to men is actually invitation to increasing the 
power of acting, freedom, perfection. But, in 
which way does God, with his action, fit within 
such a speech? In no way! He not only doesn’t 
fit but he cannot fit because God, whose essence 
is unlimited dynamism and power, cannot 
increase his power of acting since this power 
is already expressed as fully as possible. God, 
who is in every way infinite and most perfect 
being (cf. E1P11Dm2), cannot – by definition – 
move to a higher level of perfection. His power 
is unlimited because there is nothing outside 
him that could eventually limit it. Or, how 
would Spinoza explain that a stone endeavors 
to increase its power of acting?
A moment that also doesn’t fit within 
naturalistic conception is man’s imagining 
of what will be helpful to him in order to 
preserve in being and to increase his power (cf. 
E3P28). Namely, if the basic doctrine of conatus 
perseverandi in case of man is formulated with 
words: “If he does it, it helps him”23 it could 
fit within general Spinoza’s conception of self-
preservation and in that case naturalism would 
be respected as a basic structure of causing in 
Nature in which what matters is the actual set-
up of something from which proceeds some 
act. The best expression of nonteleologically 
and essentialistically understood conatus 
perseverandi we have in Spinoza’s proposition: 
“The conatus with which each thing endeavors 
to persist in its own being is nothing but the 
actual essence of the thing itself” (E3P7) 
because it is actual thing’s set-up that is stressed 
here as a basis of acting. However, Spinoza later 
conceives man’s conatus perseverandi through 
teleological formula: “If it would help him, he 
does it”, because what is stressed here is some 
23 BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., p. 229.
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future state that serves as an end understood as 
self-preservation and increasing of power. And 
so Spinoza says that we try to promote whatever 
we imagine to increase pleasure (cf. E3P28), or 
“Every man, from the laws of his own nature, 
necessarily seeks or avoids what he judges to be 
good or evil” (E4P19). Insofar as we seek what 
we judge to be good we practically realize our 
conatus perseverandi on a basis of believing that 
some action will help us to achieve some future 
end which is self-preservation and increasing 
of power. The problem is in a fact that the 
above mentioned believing doesn’t fit within 
naturalistic context because neither God, nor a 
stone, nor an oak, acts by help of belief.24
In conclusion, Spinoza obviously had 
justified and understandable reasons for 
insisting on naturalism. It is, however, too 
ambitious project that manifests its weak points 
especially in case of human behavior: in case 
of “increasing of power” and “belief” which are 
essential moments of human acting but are also 
moments that we don’t find in acting of God 
and infrahuman (especially inanimate) things.  
b) ProbleM oF ParallelisM
According to parallelism, the acting of 
body cannot be explained by the acting of mind 
because it is not caused by it, and vice-versa. 
Qualitative difference between the way how 
body acts (following the laws of mechanics and 
inertia) and how mind acts (in conscious and 
intentional way) Spinoza tends to diminish by 
levelling or bringing closer these two constitutive 
parts of man. But, was he successful about it?
Let us take the example that Spinoza 
himself puts forward: building the house (cf. 
E4Praef). For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine 
that a man builds his house alone, without help 
of building constructors. So, he imagines the 
pleasure of domestic life and wants to build a 
24 Della Rocca welcomes Spinoza’s introduction of 
believing into a speech on conatus perseverandi, but 
notes the problem that a man is – because of endeavour 
for self-preservation and increasing of power on basis 
of believing – “a kingdom within a kingdom“, that is, 
Spinoza didn’t offer a naturalistic account of belief (cf. 
DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza’s metaphysical […] op. 
cit., p.218-219). Bennett will note that Spinoza, insofar 
as belief and desire are concerned, „has no remotely 
satisfactory theory”.  (BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, 
op. cit., p. 328).  
house. But, building house is complex task that 
requires many different activities and works so 
that man could eventually live in it. All these 
activities and works must be coordinated and 
programed in a manner that, after having been 
done, man can safely live in the house. Now, if 
we apply Spinoza’s parallelism on this case then 
we find a big problem: how to explain man’s 
behavior from the perspective of his body’s 
acting? Interactionistic model wouldn’t have, in 
such a case, that sort of problem because it says 
that body accomplishes all activities as guided 
by mind (although it should, of course, offer 
some better solution of body-mind interaction 
than that of Descartes): mind knows what 
activities should be accomplished first, that 
is, it knows the order of different activities; it 
knows what material should be used at every 
stage of building, etc. However, Spinoza tries 
to explain the activity of body, when building 
house, only from the laws of body’s nature. But, 
what “explanations” does Spinoza offer and can 
they be accepted as “explanations” at all?
For example, body’s acting, when a man 
builds the house, can hardly be explained by 
mechanical and inertial laws (from “physical 
digression” after E2P13) which are followed 
by simple and inanimate bodies. Then, can 
Spinoza’s claim that “nobody has determined 
what the body can and cannot do, without 
being determined by mind”, that is, “solely 
from the laws of its nature” (E III, P2, S) 
stand as an explanation? Can we take as an 
explanation his acknowledgement that we 
actually don’t know what the body is capable 
of because “nobody as yet knows the structure 
of the body so accurately as to explain all its 
function” (ibid)? It is surprising that Spinoza 
uses analogy with animals and sleepwalkers 
who “do many things in their sleep that they 
would not dare when awake” (ibid). I think 
we can rightly make conclusion that above 
mentioned Spinoza’s “explanations” cannot 
be taken as true explanations. Namely, when 
Spinoza compares acting of man’s body, when 
building the house, with animals then that 
analogy could amount to explanation if he had 
adduce an example of some gorilla of monkey 
which built the house like man does it. Or, has 
anyone ever seen some sleepwalker building 
the house in his sleep?
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Generally speaking, the doctrine of mind-
body identity and that of parallel manifestation 
of mind’s and body’s acting are very unclear, 
especially if we try to explain man’s complex 
activities. The basic problem lays in causal 
and conceptual barrier drawn between body’s 
activities (which follow physical and inertial 
laws) and mind’s activities (which are conscious 
and intentional).
No matter how much man’s acting based 
on desire is problematic for Spinoza (so that he 
says that he doesn’t see the difference between 
appetite and desire), desire is – exactly because 
of consciousness – important to Spinoza anyway. 
If Spinoza, as the aim of his ethical project, 
stresses leaving the state of enslavement through 
passions and achieving active emotions, then 
knowledge is indispensable: “A passive emotion 
ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we 
form a clear and distinct idea of it” (E5P3). 
But, can we form a clear and distinct idea of 
some emotion if we are not aware of it? Not, of 
course! It is desire, and not appetite, crucial for 
effective transforming passive emotion into the 
active one.
In conclusion, we can say that parallelism, 
as well as naturalism, is not sufficiently solid and 
persuasive in itself to serve as strong argument 
against human teleology. If Descartes, by 
chance, had lived long enough to be able to read 
and comment Spinoza’s alternative solution to 
the problem of relation mind-body, I think he 
would have good reasons to label ironically 
Spinoza “famous man” or “true philosopher” 
wandering how could such a great man offer 
“solutions” of that kind to man’s acting. I think 
that Spinoza wasn’t successful in his project of 
levelling mind’s and body’s acting and in giving 
good alternative to interactionism. He himself 
departs from that levelling when, in process 
of teleologization of conatus perseverandi, 
the initiative regarding self-preservation and 
increasing the power ascribes more and more to 
man’s mind and not equally to mind and body, 
the issue that I’ll discuss later.    
c) causal iNterNalisM/exterNalisM
Let’s recall: Bennett developed – taking 
Spinoza’s parallelism as basis – an argument 
against human teleology which follows in this 
way: causal power of body relies exclusively 
on its intrinsic properties such as shape, size, 
position etc. If, for the moving of body, are crucial 
its intrinsic properties then the acting of mind 
must follow the same rules: representational 
properties cannot have causal or moving power 
because they are extrinsic and not intrinsic. In 
that manner, human teleology is practically 
made impossible because some external thing 
(some un/pleasant future state, for example) 
cannot move a man to action, that is, it cannot 
be causally relevant for his acting. 
However, I think that such a doctrine is 
suitable for explanation of behavior of some 
simple thing, especially in causal isolation, 
but man is everything but causally isolated. 
In another words, interaction is inevitable 
and is something that basically determine 
his constitution and action arising from that 
constitution. The best proof thereof are passions 
as the principal man’s motivation. Desire is “very 
essence, or nature, of each individual insofar 
as that is conceived as determined by some 
given state of its constitution to do something” 
(E3P56Dm). It is important here to stress that
The nature or essence of emotions cannot 
be explicated solely through our own 
essence or nature […], but must be defined 
by the potency, that is…, the nature, of 
external causes as compared with our own 
power. Hence there are as many kinds of 
each emotion as there are kinds of objects 
by which we are affected […], and men 
are affected in different ways by one and 
the same object […], and to that extent 
they differ in nature. Finally, one and the 
same man […] is affected in different ways 
toward the same object, and to that extent 
he is variable. (E4P33Dm).
After having seen that man’s constitution 
is basically affected by external things, it appears 
easier to determine the nature of content of 
ideas that constitute man’s mind. Although 
Spinoza claims that the object of mind’s idea is 
constituted by its body (cf. E2P13C and S), it is 
important to note that body exists “according as 
we sense it” (E2P13C), namely
All the modes wherein a body is affected 
follow from the nature of the body affected 
together with the nature of the affecting 
body… Therefore, the idea of these modes 
will necessarily involve the nature of both 
bodies… So the idea of any mode wherein 
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the human body is affected by an external 
body involves the nature of the human 
body and the external body. (E2P16Dm).
So, when the mind has idea of its body it 
has idea of particular state in which its body is 
at a moment, and this state or affection is result 
of interaction of own body with external bodies.
From what is said we can see that man 
is, in his action, most often determined by his 
own nature and the nature of external body as 
well. Man’s acting arises from desire, and desire 
is constituted according to nature of own body 
as it is affected by external bodies. Since desire 
is man’s basic drive for self-preservation and 
increasing the power and since man is always 
in interaction with external things that help or 
hinder that appetite (cf. E4P5), it follows that 
also ideas – on basis of which man realizes 
particular acts (since ideas reflect specific 
affectedness of own body, move and direct man’s 
acts) – depend, at least partially, on external 
things which man imagines. In that sense, it is 
justified to claim that representational features 
of ideas co-determine their motivational-causal 
power although being extrinsic. The point 
is that we must not conceive actual man’s 
constitution, in his intrinsic properties, in some 
sort of causal isolation but we must take in 
consideration external bodies that co-determine 
this constitution and enable so determined 
constitution to realize itself in a specific way 
and in a specific direction. In another words, 
representational features (based on external 
things which are “represented”) of man’s ideas 
are determined by causal interaction of own 
body with external bodies. It is important to 
stress that the same causes determine causal 
power and content of ideas as well, and this fact 
shows that “content of an idea is relevant to its 
causal powers”.25 What are implications of this 
result for the issue of human teleology?
If we have seen that idea contains 
representational properties that have essential 
role in motivating and directing the action, then 
we can and must take external causes (including 
future states) as relevant factor for determining 
motivational and directional component of those 
ideas. Ideas, in this moving property, don’t depend 
only on intrinsic properties (causal internalism) 
25 LIN, Martin. Teleology…, op. cit, p. 338.
but neither only on extrinsic properties (causal 
externalism) but on mixture of those properties, 
since some idea reflects specific encounter of 
own inner constitution or own nature and nature 
of external bodies, that is, specific interaction of 
own and external natures. Excellent example of 
such an interaction we have in passions. Insofar 
as passions are affections of body and ideas of 
those affections (cf. E3Def3), they move man 
to action which, therefore, cannot be explicated 
solely on basis of intrinsic properties that belong 
to mind’s ideas. In that way, the door is opened 
for human teleology since external things and 
future states co-determine man’s behavior 
creating in him passions.26
As we saw, Greetis insists on translating 
of controversial Spinoza’s expression comparata 
exclusively in sense of “comparing” our power 
with power of external causes. Here we should 
mention that Spinoza talks about different 
aspects of man’s interaction with external 
things that manifest certain power depending 
on their nature. So he teaches us that the 
power of some external thing can positively 
or negatively affect our power of acting: “the 
human body can be affected in many ways 
by which its power of activity is increased or 
diminished” (E III, Post1). However, here we 
have not the aspect of interaction on which 
Greetis insists: own power with certain quantity 
which can be compared with quantity of power 
of some external thing with which own power 
is in interaction. In another words and strictly 
speaking, afore mentioned “comparing” takes 
place when own power is jeopardized by 
external powers and is eventually destroyed: 
“There is in Nature no individual thing that is 
not surpassed in strength and power by some 
other thing” (E4Ax); or “the power of a man is 
limited in comparison with something else, and 
is infinitely surpassed by the power of external 
causes” (E4P3). In that sense, a man shares the 
destiny of all other things: thanks to external 
things, he exists; on interaction with them 
depends his increasing and diminishing of his 
power of action; this interaction will, finally, lead 
him to destruction caused by external causes. 
26 “[...] to the extent to which our behavior is motivated 
by thoughts about the future and external objects, it is 
motivated by passions”, LIN, Martin. Teleology and […]. 
op. cit., p. 342.
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However, when evaluating Greetis’ criticism of 
Lin’s translation of comparata as “paired”, we 
must take in consideration the context in which 
this word shows up. If we consider man’s power 
in interaction with external powers solely from 
the point of view of quantity, we must, together 
with Spinoza and Greetis, conclude that our 
power is weaker than external powers and will 
eventually be surpassed by them. Quantitatively 
speaking, our power is weaker in comparison 
with external things and in this sense we should 
use the translation of comparata in manner 
which Greetis promotes (compared). But, it is 
important to notice that our power of acting 
must be determined qualitatively too: “there 
are as many kinds of each emotion as there 
are kinds of objects by which we are affected” 
(E4P33Dm).
Greetis claims: 
although the causal power of passions, as 
we learned above, rely on intrinsic natures, 
i.e., the essence or desire of the thing 
affected and how much its conatus is helped 
or hindered, the passions themselves are 
widely individuated. That is, the causal 
powers of passions are simply desire, 
but to provide a complete explanation of 
passions, they can be termed according to 
their external causes.27
No doubt that man’s essence is, above all, his 
power to persevere in being and increase his 
power. It cannot be something else than power 
since it is an expression of divine essence which is 
unlimited power of existing and acting. It is useful 
to draw here the parallel between divine and 
human power regarding one important aspect. 
Namely, divine infinite power is connected with 
divine perfection on one side and, on the other 
side, Spinoza claims that “Nothing exists from 
whose nature an effect does not follow” (E1P36). 
In other words, from necessarily existing divine 
essence there must necessarily follow effects. 
What are these effects? Infinite and finite modes 
which, under different attributes, express divine 
power. It means that divine power is realized 
(that is, it has effects) by being expressed in 
concrete ways, i.e., through concrete modes. 
Existing of finite modes also depends on their 
producing some effects:
27 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s Rejection…, 
op. cit., pp. 31-32.
Whatever exists expresses God’s nature or 
essence in a definite and determinate way 
[…]; that is […], whatever exists expresses 
God’s power, which is the cause of all 
things, in a definite and determinate way, 
and so […] some effect must follow from 
it.  (E1P36Dm).
It is clear, from this statement, that 
man’s causal powers, in order to exist at all, 
must be realized in some effects. To be realized 
in some effects, they must be determined 
quantitatively and qualitatively just as the 
divine power is realized through quantitative-
qualitative concretizations of its modes. Man’s 
powers can gain their quantitative-qualitative 
determination only through some interaction 
with external things. So, the basic point is as 
follows: man’s power cannot exist without being 
realized in some way; to be realized, it must be 
determined quantitatively and qualitatively; this 
quantitative-qualitative determination can be 
gained only through interaction with external 
things and their powers. In another words, 
interaction with external powers represents 
conditio sine qua non for realization of own 
power. In that sense, the aspect of interaction, 
through which some passion gains its external 
denomination (cf. E3DA48E), is superficial 
aspect. Of course, interaction offers such external 
denomination but its role is much deeper and 
more important because it determines passions 
quantitatively and qualitatively, and external 
denomination is only consequence of such 
a determination. In that deeper ontological 
sense, it is justified to talk about our power 
which is paired with power of external thing 
through interaction as basis for quantitative-
qualitative determination of own power. Could 
own power, by itself, determine itself what to 
do or how to act and in which direction? No! 
What would own power be without interaction 
with some external power that open possibility 
for own power to act in some specific way? 
Maybe some diffusive tension, but that tension, 
which strives to be realized, couldn’t be 
realized without interaction. In another words, 
considering own power in causal isolation and 
without interaction can be only some sort of 
thought experiment. It is true that everything, 
including man, has its basic dynamism from 
inside (as a specific expression of divine essence 
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which is pure power),28 but this dynamism can 
be realized and can produce some effect only 
through interaction with external things (their 
essences and powers). Human passions are co-
caused (and in that sense paired) with external 
things: “The essence of a passive emotion 
cannot be explicated through own essence 
alone” (E4P5Dm). Something is explicable only 
taking in consideration its cause. If our passions 
are explicable not only through our own 
essence but through our essence and essence of 
external thing, then our passions are caused by 
our essence and essence of external thing.    
To conclude, representational properties 
of ideas cannot be neglected when it is about 
their causal powers because causal powers of 
ideas arise from the constitution of body as it 
is determined after being affected by external 
things. Ideas, when express constitution of their 
bodies, express their particular affection after 
interaction with external things. On that affection 
depends man’s behavior. Specific affection 
depends on specific natures of external things. 
The constitution of body must be, in order to be 
determined for action, concretized quantitatively 
and qualitatively and such a concretization is 
achieved solely through interaction with external 
things (including future states or events) which 
have specific power depending on their specific 
nature. In that sense, the proper essence or 
power acts in synergy with external essences and 
because of that we can – and must – say that 
own power is paired with external powers. The 
outcome of that synergy is readiness for action 
since such an action is directed towards concrete 
effect because the body’s constitution itself, 
from which action receives its basic impetus, is 
concretized.
d) the issue oF scieNtiFic aNd eNlighteNMeNt reasoNs
As for scientific reasons which Spinoza 
adduce against human teleology, we can say 
that the question of how much the whole 
Nature acts according to formal and efficient 
causes is essentially connected with issue of 
how much naturalism is solid as doctrine. 
Naturalism is, of course, important doctrine 
that Spinoza promotes, but we can rightly ask is 
28 “a thing does not receive any of its causal powers 
externally” (GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza’s 
Rejection…, op. cit., p. 31).
such a doctrine realizable in such a radical form 
as our philosopher believed it was possible. 
Is the approach, which stresses only formal 
and efficient causes, applicable completely on 
human behavior? Man’s endeavor to preserve 
in being and to increase his power of acting – 
by imagining future states and through belief 
that they will contribute to his pleasure – only 
shows that the project of radical naturalism is 
hardly realizable and that a man still stands as 
“a kingdom within a kingdom”.
As for enlightenment reasons, we 
cannot adduce strict philosophical counter-
arguments since they are motivated by 
Spinoza’s humanistic-enlightening endeavor. 
Spinoza tried to help people not to suffer from 
passions upheld through prejudices promoted 
by theologians. The fear of future punishment 
or hope in future reward are probably the 
strongest passions which don’t allow men 
to breath freely in this life and make them 
subjected to religious authorities. The fear of 
hell and hope in heaven can be eliminated if 
men are persuaded that they don’t act guided by 
some end but starting from actual constitution. 
Against those passions, Spinoza fought not only 
by means of his antiteleology but by means of 
other doctrines too: deanthropomorphized God 
who cannot be “judge”; necessitarianism which 
excludes freedom and moral responsibility; 
doctrine of mind’s “eternity”, according to which 
human mind doesn’t survive its body. Spinoza 
tried to enlighten his readers helping them to 
get know the whole Nature, their true place in 
it and what they can expect and hope for. 
e) Teleological interpretation of conatus perseverandi
Although conatus perseverandi is the basic 
moving force of man’s acting, that strive for 
self-preservation is basic characteristic of every 
thing and not only men. But things differ in a 
way how they realize their conatus perseverandi. 
Man’s specificity consists in that that he can 
realize his conatus imagining different future 
states that can more or less successfully help 
him in satisfying his basic striving. Exactly 
through this imagining future states as ends he 
manifests his superiority in comparison to other 
things. Thanks to his intellect, he developed 
different sciences and knowledges and he can 
most effectively apply them if he foresees some 
92 Revista Conatus - FilosoFia de spinoza - volume 10 - númeRo 20 - dezembRo 2018
FRIDL, MIRosLav. Spinoza on human Teleology. p. 77-99
desirable future state and knows how to achieve 
desired future state using different means. So, 
man can imagine future states and valuate them 
by criterion which one will be more useful to 
him for his self-preservation.
However, when imagining future desirable 
states as possible – one of which he puts as most 
desirable end and acts according to that end – 
he presents himself as acting like “a kingdom 
within a kingdom”. The problem is not only 
that man in that way oversteps the boundary 
of strict naturalism but such an action is hardly 
compatible with necessitarianism. Namely, if 
Spinoza says that in future is possible only one 
state because the actual constitution of reality 
allows only one future state, then imagining and 
believing that something will happen implies 
contingency, which is incompatible with strict 
spinozistic necessitarianism. Belief has not only 
epistemic aspect in a sense that we don’t know 
what will actually happen in future but also 
ethical aspect in a sense that we believe that this 
or that future state will help us in realization 
of our conatus. Belief is, in this context, very 
important but also very controversial element 
which we should discuss in detail. 
Spinoza doesn’t speak systematically of 
possibility of belief’s fitting with his system but 
he is aware of the fact that belief or imagining is 
inevitable component of man’s behavior: 
We endeavor to bring about whatever we 
imagine to be conducive to pleasure; but 
we endeavor to remove or destroy whatever 
we imagine to be opposed to pleasure and 
conducive to pain. (E3P28).
It can be seen, from this important proposition, 
that our acting is based primarily on our 
striving to gain pleasure and remove pain. In 
this process, we imagine (imaginamur) or 
believe that something will be conducive to 
pleasure. It can also be seen that man’s acting 
is directed toward particular end (increasing 
pleasure and destroying pain) and that in this 
sense it is not, and cannot be, neutral regarding 
its directedness. 
The source of our belief is the lack of 
knowledge of ourselves and external things that 
affect us. We don’t know the whole network 
of causes and effects and cannot but guess 
what will happen. When the mind conceives 
external things through its body, it can have 
only inadequate knowledge because it conceives 
them in a manner how they affect our body and 
not what they are in themselves. Then, the mind 
doesn’t have adequate knowledge about its body 
because it conceives it in specific constellation 
which depends on a way how it is affected by 
external things. Particular affectedness of own 
body is always result of fortuitous encounter 
of our body and external bodies. Adequate 
knowledge consists in finding some common and 
stabile elements in all things and not in being 
dependent on fortuitous affections of our body.
If we talk about man’s acting directed 
to some future state which is un/desirable for 
him, it is important to stress that he cannot 
have adequate knowledge about this future 
state. Such a state will, by itself, happen 
in a determined way but man doesn’t have 
introspection in causal network responsible 
for realization of that future state which is the 
only one possible. He can, with his adequate 
knowledge, have only introspection in general 
and common constitution of things but not the 
introspection whether this constitution will lead 
to the concrete future state that would be useful 
to him. As the highest form of the knowledge, 
Spinoza defines intuitive knowledge and “this 
kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate 
idea of the formal essence of certain attributes 
of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence 
of things” (E2P40S2). This kind of knowledge is 
adequate insofar as every essence is conceived 
in its being caused by formal essence of some 
divine attribute, but it doesn’t help man to know 
some future state.
So, a man finds himself in an unenviable 
situation: on one side, he is pushed to do 
something that will help him in his self-
preservation and increasing his power of action 
and, on the other side, he doesn’t know whether 
some of his action will bring about desired future 
state which he imagines to be useful to him. It 
means that his action cannot be but action based 
on belief that something will happen that is 
useful to him. When he “imagines” such a future 
state, he can only endeavor to make it happen 
or not to happen. Even if he has true directives 
(through the reason’s commandments), he has 
to use inadequate knowledge for fulfillment 
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of those directives.29 If intellect tells us, for 
example, that we have to strive for something 
that is really useful to us, all we can do is to 
apply, through inadequate knowledge and 
according to specific circumstances, some means 
for implementation of that general directive. 
Or, if our reason tells us that we should be close 
to rational people who we can imitate, we still 
have to evaluate whether somebody is rational 
in a sense that he can be our example how to 
develop love towards God. In this evaluation, we 
have to rely on previous experience which can 
be useful (cf. E4App27) although it is gained 
through fortuitous interaction with external 
things. Regardless of how much belief based on 
inadequate knowledge can be imperfect means 
for realization of our conatus perseverandi, the 
fact is that it contributes to the teleological 
interpretation of man’s conatus and not to the 
non-teleological one.
Useful distinction of formulas of striving for 
self-preservation offers Bennett who expresses 
non-teleological formula as follows: “If he does 
it, it will help him”; and teleological formula 
he expresses as follows: “If it would help him, 
he will do it”.30 The first formula stresses the 
actual man’s constitution responsible for his 
doing something that will help him to preserve 
in being and increase the power of acting. 
Spinoza, in the beginning, puts his doctrine of 
conatus perseverandi in a clear non-teleological 
sense. After having stated that “Each thing, 
insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist 
in its own being” (E3P6), he identifies very 
soon conatus with actual essence of thing (cf. 
E3P7) and interprets the acting of a thing 
in an essentialistic sense: “From the given 
essence of a thing certain things necessarily 
follow… nor do things effect anything other 
than that which necessarily follows from their 
determinate nature” (E3P7Dm). Here we 
still don’t find mention of consciousness and 
its role in realizing conatus. Also, the speech 
about conatus perseverandi up to this moment 
is general and can easily fit within naturalistic 
conception insofar as the behavior of everything 
can be explained in sense of its essence and 
29 Cf. KISNER, Matthew J. Spinoza on Human 
Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011, pp. 189-190.
30 BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…., op. cit., p. 244.
what follows from it. If we recall Bennett’s non-
teleological formula, we can say that everything 
does what follows from its nature and will help 
it in its self-preservation.
However, the “twist” begins with E3P9 
when Spinoza introduces the element typical 
of human striving for self-preservation: 
consciousness. Namely, man has not only this 
striving but consciousness thereof too: desire 
(cf. E3P9S). In the beginning, Spinoza treats 
this consciousness in a way that the mind, with 
its ideas, shares the same fate of its body when 
it passes to greater or lesser perfection (cf. 
E3P11 and S). However, in Spinoza’s treatment 
of man’s conatus there shows up a new element: 
the mind is not treated anymore as the one which 
passively shares the fate of his body but as the 
man’s constitutive part which takes initiative in 
achieving greater perfection: “The mind, as far 
as it can, endeavors to think of those things that 
increase or assist the body’s power of activity” 
(E3P12). This different statements in Spinoza’s 
doctrine of conatus can be seen as stages in a 
process of teleologization which culminates in 
Spinoza’s proposition:
We endeavor to bring about whatever we 
imagine to be conducive to pleasure; but 
we endeavor to remove or destroy whatever 
we imagine to be opposed to pleasure and 
conducive to pain. (E3P28).
Self-preservation is not seen any more 
as mere striving by which man doesn’t differ 
from other things but as an end which is he 
conscious of (together with the means necessary 
for achieving that end) and which he tries to 
achieve through belief. In another words, man 
acts focused on the effect of his acting, which 
doesn’t mean that there is no moving force that 
“pushes” him from behind but the accent is on 
some future state that, in the first place, makes 
it possible that that “pushing” happens because 
it shows desired direction in which it would be 
useful to act. Man is, of course, driven to do 
something that will preserve his being and will 
increase his power of acting, but first he has 
to evaluate what will help him and to focus on 
end and means necessary for achieving desired 
future state. If the whole story was exhausted 
only in acting from his actual constitution, that 
is, in a way of acting only efficiently, then it 
would be difficult (or impossible) find the best 
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direction for realization of conatus. Or, we can put 
the question: how would man, anyway, realize 
his conatus if he is not aware of consequences his 
action will lead to? How would he differ from 
other infrahuman and inferior things? If he has 
on disposition higher level of knowledge and 
consciousness, then he is supposed to act using 
those capabilities. Even more, he is obliged to 
use those capabilities in order to act the best 
way he can, or to realize his conatus in the most 
effective way. If he, in this process, can be helped 
by focusing on some future state for which he 
believes to fulfill in best way his basic striving, 
then he “must” act that way.
Moreover, don’t fit within such a context 
of superior or more efficacious self-preservation 
two very important (but controversial too!) 
elements contained in his central proposition 
about conatus perseverandi: “as far as he can” and 
“tries”? These two expressions from EIII,P6 we 
can understand in a sense that man is abandoned 
to himself and his powers, capabilities and 
means that he has on disposition to preserve his 
being and increase his power of acting. If one of 
those capabilities is that of conscious imagining 
of end and means necessary for obtaining it, 
than he has to use it, because that is the only 
way he can promote his self-preservation and 
increase his power of acting as far as he can.
Belief is not connected with conatus 
only in a manner that we saw so far but it is 
present in other aspects of human behavior 
as well although all of them spring from this 
basic conatus. Spinoza defines love as “pleasure 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause” 
(E3P13S). This external cause is responsible 
for man to feel some pleasure and that is why 
man loves it. However, there are also possible 
situations in which it suffice to imagine or 
believe that the beloved thing is destroyed to 
feel pain, and vice-versa: “He who imagines 
that what he loves is being destroyed will feel 
pain. If, however, he imagines that it is being 
preserved, he will feel pleasure” (E3P19). So, 
Spinoza teaches that mere belief in existing 
external thing of which we think that makes 
pleasure to us is enough for us to feel that 
pleasure. We should remember that pleasure 
means increasing the power. But, it seems that 
in that way man creates some parallel world 
which perhaps doesn’t coincide with the real 
one. Such a treatment of pleasure and pain is 
hardly compatible with naturalistic context on 
which Spinoza otherwise insists, or “he does not 
provide, and does not clearly have the resources 
to provide, a naturalistic account of belief”.31 
Let’s imagine someone with very strange sense 
of humor who tells me that one person, very 
dear to me, died. Let’s imagine that I believed 
him because I could not find out no sign that 
would foster my suspicion. There arises in me 
pain which is caused by what? Objective event 
or my subjective belief? It seems that belief 
corrupts Spinoza’s naturalism insofar as other 
things don’t feel pleasure or pain on basis of 
their imagining but on basis of some real cause.
It is interesting enough to see the 
connection between psychological mechanism of 
anticipation and belief. We can say that doctrine 
of anticipation is the strongest Spinoza’s weapon, 
within psychology, against human teleology 
because he explains, with this doctrine, the future 
ends departing from actual man’s constitution 
which projects in future some end that should 
be realized in order to increase pleasure and 
diminish pain. If imagining some future state 
provokes the present pleasure of anticipation 
then this present pleasure – and not the future 
pleasure – will work as factor moving man to act. 
Spinoza tries to gain, in that way, immediateness 
of cause and effect taking care of direction of 
causing, that is, from the present to the future. 
But, how the present pleasure arises anyway? 
By imagining some future state that I evaluate 
as un/pleasant after which in me arises pleasure 
or pain which moves me to action. In another 
words, “projection” works after I have imagined 
some future state that can be “end” projected 
from my actual constitution. If I take medicine 
today because I expect or believe that I’ll avoid 
tomorrow’s pain, than taking medicine is caused 
by present pain developed through anticipation 
of tomorrow’s pain, but the present pain would 
not have arisen if I had not imagined tomorrow’s 
anticipated pain. So, the present pleasure or pain 
of anticipation exists and can move to action only 
through belief or expecting. But we can find out 
that some belief is not justified.32
31 DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza’s metaphysical…, 
op. cit., p. 222.
32 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. A Study…, op. cit., pp. 216-
218.
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Belief is also indispensable in another 
psychological mechanism: imitation (cf. E3P23 
and 27). Spinoza teaches us that for existing in 
us some emotion it suffice to imagine other men 
who are affected by that emotion. Of course, 
we can be completely wrong when evaluating 
other men and their emotions. If Spinoza invites 
us to imitate men who developed adequate 
knowledge and love for God, then he also 
invites us to use inadequate knowledge because 
only that way can we judge other men to be 
really in a state which we imagine they are in.
Belief is, epistemologically speaking, 
inferior to adequate knowledge but it is 
indispensable in many man’s behaviors. Moreover, 
belief can sometimes directly help man to preserve 
his being and increase the power of acting. If we 
have to be subjected to dangerous and difficult 
operation of heart, we have to believe that doctor 
is sufficiently qualified and that he really wants 
to help us. Or, if we walk through some area and 
find the sign: “Attention, mines!”, we’ll probably 
save our lives by believing that there are indeed 
mines on that area.  
As for human teleology, I think that 
belief and imagining calls for teleological 
explanation of conatus perseverandi because 
it stresses consciousness and intentionality in 
directing man’s acting. I think that teleological 
approach best explains very important issue of 
directedness of human acting, at least in some 
important cases of human life. In order to be 
able to evaluate teleological approach, let’s see 
first the other two approaches.
Inertial model of human acting relies on 
the model of mechanical physics according to 
which scientists interpret moving of bodies in 
physical realm. According to this model, bodies 
move rectilinearly without stopping unless 
some other body acts on them and changes their 
direction, speed or stops them. Or, if bodies are 
in rest they try, by themselves, stay in that state. 
In that sense, J. Carriero describes Spinoza’s 
understanding of acting as follows:
The main idea behind Spinoza’s account 
of agency is to take the picture he finds in 
simple situations in the new science and 
to apply it systematically. Simple bodies, 
when not interfered with by other bodies, 
just continue to do what they are already 
doing through a metaphysical inertia. 
Their motive tendencies are not structured 
about ends.33 
According to inertial model, when it is applied 
to mind’s area, man’s ideas possess mental 
inertia to remain in actual form of existence.34
Problem of directedness of man’s acting 
is resolved here by starting from man’s moving 
tendency. When it is accompanied with 
consciousness, we try to confirm it and this 
confirmation amounts to belief that where this 
tendency leads us is – good. This understanding 
of “good” Spinoza actually promotes when he 
says that we strive for something not because 
we judge it as good but we judge it as good 
because we strive for it. In other words, 
evaluation of good is accommodated to basic 
tendency, not vice-versa. In that way, the 
primacy of efficient cause is confirmed while 
final cause appears to be some kind of fiction 
based on projection and imagining where that 
tendency would lead us.
In comparison to inertial model, 
essentialistic model stresses more the specific 
essence of something, and this essence should 
be conceived in its basic reality: it is power. As 
we know, Spinoza builds his ontology starting 
from God as the unique substance which is 
unlimited power of being and acting. This 
power is concretized and expressed through 
different modes every one of which is specific 
exemplification of divine essence. Like the source 
of every God’s causal acting is his essence, the 
source of every thing’s acting is its essence. 
According to essentialism, conatus 
perseverandi should be interpreted in sense that 
everything tends to realize fully its essence and 
not merely stay in a state in which it actually 
exists. We can find here great difference in 
comparison with inertial model. There is 
difference in one other important aspect too: this 
model is more suitable for explanation of thing’s 
acting in context of its inevitable interaction 
with other things, while inertial model is more 
suitable for explanation of thing’s acting in its 
causal isolation.35
33 I take this quotation from: VILJANEN, Valtteri. 
Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. cit., p. 172.
34 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 173.
35 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 227.
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As for direction of acting, essentialism 
teaches that something will realize its essence 
in direction where it finds least resistance 
and avoids teleological directedness of acting. 
Viljanen, the proponent of this mode, admits – 
in his excellent book on dynamism in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics – that every action, to be realized, 
must be directed in some direction, but it doesn’t 
mean that it must have an end toward which it 
will act: “Any power needs a direction; but it 
does not need a telos, nor does Spinoza think 
it would”.36 He applies such a interpretative 
scheme to man and he tries to resolve the 
problem of directedness of his man’s acting by 
using analogy with water masses and river dam: 
river flows in direction in which it encounters 
the least resistance.37 Similarly, man’s acting is 
directed where it encounters the least resistance 
or maximum help in its basic striving to realize 
his essence. In that context, pleasure and pain 
show  which direction gives bigger or lesser 
resistance.
What about man’s acting through 
belief? Viljanen first offers explanatory scheme 
applicable to the action of every thing: “If, of the 
options available to X, A causes most pleasure 
to X, X strives to do or maintain A” and then – 
in cases of man’s acting through belief – offers 
scheme: “If, of the images present to X, Iᴀ causes 
most pleasure to X, X strives to attain A”.38 
Exactly in case of man’s acting, when it is realized 
through imagining something that brings to man 
the most pleasure, Viljanen is ready to allow 
teleological explanation of such action:
if we define teleology as a style of 
explanation in which events are explained 
by their (presumptive) effects, it is 
obviously possible, based on aforesaid, to 
construct teleological action explanation.39 
 However, Viljanen promptly claims 
that it would be mistake to consider Spinoza 
as declared teleologist since he believed it was 
possible to realize thoroughly reductionistic 
program or to reduce the statements containing 
36 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 242.
37 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 233.
38 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…., op. 
cit., p. 238.
39 Ibid.
teleological expressions into ones that don’t 
contain them. Viljanen also believes that 
teleological explanation of man’s acting is not 
suitable and complete and instead of it he offers 
the one arising from his essentialism:
If we know (1) X’s essence and what follows 
from it alone, (2) that X strives against 
any opposition to fully realize its essence, 
(3) that X directs its power to where it is 
least resisted (or least sorrow is felt), (4) 
what is X’s prevailing state or constitution, 
and (5) in what circumstances must X 
operate, we are in position to provide 
adequate explanations and predictions of 
X’s actions.40
The advantage of such a model Viljanen sees 
in that that in this way we respect ontological 
order of things, since “The essence is always 
ontologically prior and the cause, its effects (that 
which we strive to bring about, often falsely 
called ends) are ontologically posterior”.41
In the same manner, the existence of 
something that we consider good depends 
on essence’s constitution. Here we can see a 
parallel with Descartes’ conception of God who 
by his own will determines or sets “good”. So, 
as something is good because God chose it 
(it is not chosen by God because it is good in 
itself) in the same way – in man’s case – “good” 
is such because it arises from human essence’s 
constitution and it is not the case that man’s 
essence should adjust to some “objectively” 
determined good.
When we talk about the problem of 
directedness of man’s acting, particularity of 
teleological model lays in putting accent on 
conscious and intentional acting, which is 
directed to some end and is mediated through 
belief. It is of crucial importance to show whether 
man realizes or not his conatus, at least in some 
cases, by acting with ends (some future state 
that is un/desirable for him) in view. In order 
to show validity of this model it is necessary 
put forward some comparative advantages in 
comparison to two aforementioned models.
As for inertial model, it seems that it 
has two basic defects. First, it is suitable for 
40 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 240.
41 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 243.
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explanation of things in causal isolation. Or, if 
we talk after all about interaction among things 
(physical digression after E2P13) here we have 
simple physical bodies that cannot be compared, 
by the complexity of their constitution, with 
man. Man is, as complex spiritual-corporeal 
unity, always in hardly understandable and 
predictable interaction with other things and 
we must take in account this fact when talking 
about man’s action or passion. Man’s being 
free from interaction with other things is only 
thought experiment:
if it were possible for man to undergo 
no changes except those which can be 
understood solely through his own nature, 
it would follow … that he cannot perish but 
would always necessarily exist. (E4P4Dm).
The man’s complexity, which is far bigger than 
that of simple, inanimate and unconscious 
physical thing, presupposes far complex 
interaction with external things, with 
consequence that man is affected by external 
things in much more complex way than simple 
physical things.
Then, insofar as we have – in inertial 
model – claim about retaining the state in which 
some body actually exists, that could create 
problem when interpreting man’s acting. Namely, 
man not only tries to remain in his existence but 
he also tries to increase his power/perfection/
freedom/activity. Even if this power’s increasing 
essentially is in function of self-preservation, it 
is undeniable phenomenon that can hardly fit 
within inertial model. Man’s mind not only tries 
“to think of those things that increase or assist 
the body’s power of activity” (E3P12) but also 
tries to act that way (cf. E3P28).
As for essentialist model, it takes into 
account bigger complexity of man’s constitution42 
and the fact that man strives for increasing his 
power, because it is about “idea, fundamental 
for the dynamics of our emotions”.43 In the 
same manner, we can say that this model 
respects radically the basic ontological premises 
of spinozism insofar as it tries to explain man’s 
acting in the same way as divine acting. Namely, 
42 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 226.
43 VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 225.
if the divine essence is the only acting thing and 
this thing doesn’t act for some purpose, then 
neither man can act for some purpose. If man is 
expression of the divine essence, then his action 
must have antiteleological structure like the 
divine one. If divine essence, which is power, 
acts through formal and efficient causes, than 
man acts that way too.
However, I find problematic the way 
how man’s behavior – according to essentialism 
– should be explained. To be able to offer 
proper and full explanation of man’s behavior, 
we should first have to know man’s essence 
and what follows from it.44 Does Spinoza offer 
useful information about man’s essence in view 
of man’s acting? Let’s look first some definitions 
and descriptions that Spinoza gives.
First of all, man’s essence is “constituted 
by definite modifications of the attributes of 
God” (E2P10C), or man consists of modes which 
express God’s nature in determined way (cf. 
E1P25C). Man’s mind is idea of his body and this 
body is complex individuum which retains his 
specific identity as long as his constitutive parts 
“preserve the same mutual relation of motion-
and-rest as before” (E2P13Ax3Lemma5), where 
retaining of aforementioned relation means 
retaining its nature. Man’s nature realizes itself, 
in concrete life, through conatus and this one 
is shaped through interaction with external 
and fortuitous things. Exactly this interaction 
and its results (the concrete man’s constitution 
determined for action) are hardly knowable 
because we don’t have adequate knowledge 
nor of ourselves, nor of external bodies, nor of 
the results of interaction of our body with other 
bodies. So, can we know what will be man’s 
acting in some particular situation? Viljanen 
responds that man will act – like river’s masses 
– in a direction where he finds least resistance. 
But what exactly direction is that? If we don’t 
(and can’t) know ourselves and external things 
and if we don’t know relevant network of causes 
and effects, then we can’t know the directedness 
of our action in a concrete situation. We 
could only state a posteriori that man acted 
in this direction because there he found least 
resistance. I think that teleological model has 
44 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. Spinoza’s Dynamics…, op. 
cit., p. 240.
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advantage when, stressing the conscious and 
intentional imagining of desirable future state, 
better explains why the action went in this and 
not in that direction.
When we try to resolve this problem, 
of course, we have to take into account man’s 
ontological position in causal set-up of the 
whole Nature. The only causes that Spinoza 
allows in this Nature are formal and efficient 
ones. However, when we try to explain the 
concrete man’s action then it seems that formal 
and efficient causal scheme is not sufficient. We 
can (and must) talk about man as efficient cause 
insofar as we consider the basic moving force 
that pushes him to act, but this moving force is 
quantitatively-qualitatively determined through 
the result of his interaction with other things. 
How this moving force is actually determined 
we see by its effects realized by action which 
is always directed in some direction. Desire, 
which move to action, doesn’t mean only 
consciousness of appetite but consciousness 
of some external thing or future state which, 
through imagining and belief, co-determine 
this desire. Desire makes it possible conscious 
striving toward some end and only through this 
striving, actualized by being directed towards 
some future end, we can best see what was this 
desire like. Insofar it is right to appeal to final 
causes in order to explain concrete man’s acts.
The probable difficulty (or impossibility) 
to explain man’s realization of conatus only in 
inertial or essentialistic manner made Spinoza 
to “teleologize” his central doctrine of conatus 
perseverandi. This teleologization begins with 
E3P7 and culminate in E3P28. The fact that 
Spinoza transfers initiative, when it is about 
directing man’s action, to mind and not to 
man as whole (mind and body) additionally 
confirms teleological model which stresses 
acting and initiative of mind and not of man 
as whole (or body alone). If the problem 
of directedness of man’s acting can be best 
resolved by teleological model, it must be 
preferred. In the same manner, if acting, guided 
by end, assures more efficaciously persevering 
in being and increasing of power then man 
“must” act that way otherwise he wouldn’t do 
his best: he wouldn’t use all possible means he 
has on disposition when affirming his essence; 
he wouldn’t act as far as he can.
Teleological model has advantage in all 
cases of complex and important man’s behavior 
when it is crucial for him to pick up the right 
and best direction. We spoke of building house, 
but let’s consider another example: young man 
Tomislav wants, after high school, to study 
something. His first choice is philosophy but 
he is also interested in management. Then he 
starts to think about other issues important to 
him: he would like to make as much money as 
possible because he wants to live in a big house; 
he wants to drive good car; he wants to have 
some house on a coast for summer holiday; he 
wants to have enough money to be able to pay 
expensive schools for his children etc. And here 
comes troubles: if specialization in philosophy 
doesn’t assure all those benefits, he will decide 
to study management although his biggest love 
is philosophy. In this and many other important 
life situations man has to ponder about various 
possible future states that are relevant to him. 
He has to evaluate and compare what future 
state would most efficaciously assure him self-
preservation and increasing of power. He has to 
evaluate which means he has on disposition to 
achieve some of desirable state. It doesn’t mean 
that man will in every situation act that way 
(sometimes he will act by inertia, sometimes in 
direction where he finds least resistance), but he 
will certainly do his best to realize his conatus – 
when it is about complex and important issues 
of his life – in most efficacious manner. If 
thinking of possible and desirable future states 
and means for achieving them helps him to do 
what is most useful to him, he is obliged to act 
teleologically because only in this way he does 
what he truly can. Finally, isn’t he superior to 
other beings exactly by this capability to hold 
on and ponder, in complex and important 
life situations, about different possible future 
outcomes, instead of acting instinctively or 
being guided by principle of choosing direction 
where he finds least resistance? 
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